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Beginning in the mid-1960s, the United States economy has witnessed the revival of
one of its most distinguishing features: mass immigration. Indeed, a recent comprehensive
study of U.S. society, conducted by an international team of social science scholars,
concluded that "America's biggest import is people." It added that "at a time when
attention is directed to the general decline in American exceptionalism, American
immigration continues to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in the world. "I The prospect
for the foreseeable future is for a continuation -- and probable acceleration -- of the
phenomenon.
Public recognition that immigration has once again assumed a prominent role in the
U.S. economy however, has been slow to develop. Immigration had significantly declined
in importance from the 1920s through to the mid-1960s. As officially measured, the
foreign born percentage of the population had steadily fallen from 13.2 percent in 1920 to
4.7 percent in 1970. The foreign born population in 1980, however, rose to 6.2 percent of
the population (a 46 percent increase over the 1970 figure). Given policy developments
during the 1980s, the figure for 1990 could easily approach 9 percent (or about one of
every eleven person in the U.S. population). Even these percentages are widely suspected
of being too low due to the belief that there was a significant undercount of illegal
immigrants by the 1980 Census and the anticipation of similar problems in the 1990
2Census.2 By the year 2000, if current trends continue, the percentage should again
approach the high level of 1920.
The main reason that the effects of the resurgence of mass immigration have not
received more attention is that the impact is highly geographically concentrated. Six
states -- California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and lllinois -- account for 38.4
percent of the U.S. population but 71.4 percent of all immigrants admitted to the U.S. in
1987. Moreover, within the states, immigrants have overwhelmingly settled in urban areas.
They are essentially It an urban phenomenon.1t3 In 1980, 92 percent of the foreign born
population that was actually counted by the Census lived in metropolitan areas compared to
only 72 percent of the native born population. Thus, the magnified effects of mass
immigration are felt only in some urban areas of a handful of states. These urban areas
and states, however, are the largest labor markets in the U.S. economy. Hence, there is
national as well as local significance to these developments.
New York is an excellent case in point. The state has always been a primary
receiver of immigrants. In 1960, the foreign born population accounted for 12.5 percent of
the state's population. By 1980, that percentage had increased to 13.6 percent (more than
twice the national percentage). Within the state, it has been New York City, of course,
that has traditionally borne the bulk of the accommodation pressure. In 1960, 20.0 percent
of the City's population were foreign born; by 1980 the percentage had risen to 23.6
percent (almost 4 times the national percentage). The 1990 Census should reveal that at
least 25 percent of the City's population will be foreign born (or one of every 4 New York
City residents). Even these high percentages are suspected of being far too low due to the
widely perceived notion of an extensive undercount of illegal immigrants in the City's
3population 'and work force. (For example, City officials estimated that only 200,000 of the
750,000 illegal immigrants in New York City were counted in the 1980 Census -- at least
550,000 illegal immigrants were not counted).4 Thus, New York City accounted for
slightly over 70 percent of the New York State's total foreign born population. Of the
immigrants who have moved into New York State since 1965, 80 percent have settled in
New York City with an additional 13 percent moving into its adjacent suburbs. It is not
surprising, therefore, that a 1988 study of post-1960s immigration concluded that
"immigration into New York State is almost entirely immigration into New York City and
its suburbs. lIS
The sheer magnitude of the immigrant flow -- especially into a state like New
York -- is sufficient cause to review the intentions of the nation's existing immigration
policy. But, given the fact that mass immigration is occurring at a time when the labor
markets of the nation in general and of New York in particular are both in a stage of
radical transformation, uncenainty about the human capital characteristics of the immigrant
flow adds necessity to such an inquiry. Old industries that once provided an almost
insatiable demand for immigrants as well as for many citizen workers are now in a stage
of sharp employment contraction. New industries have developed but they often have
employment requirements that make it difficult for many citizens and immigrants to
qualify.
Perceptions of the Role of Immigration Policy
It is precisely because of the issue of labor market transformation that the issue of
labor shonages has arisen. A transformation means a rapid break from the slow
evolutionary patterns of change. In such a context, the relevant question is: are there
4actual shortages of workers because there are simply not enough workers or is there a
mismatch that involves shortages of qualified workers co-existing with surpluses of
unqualified workers or would-be workers?
If the issue is the former, than the prevailing unguided immigration policy of the
United States is acceptable. There are millions of people who want to immigrate to the
United States, so just let some of them in. There is no need to be picky about their skill,
education, linguistic abilities or where they wish to settle. Indeed, just such a course of
action is precisely what the Wall Street Journal recently advocated in an editorial saying
that the United States should simply admit everyone in the World who wants to enter.6
If it is the latter case, however, a diametrically different policy tact is required.
The existence of a mismatch means that the nation should have a carefully administered
and flexible immigration policy. Immigration could provide a. means of filling job
vacancies in the short run while long run domestic human resource development policies
are adopted to prepare the native born population for these emerging jobs. The mismatch
scenario also has a vital corollary. It is that immigration policy should be used to keep-
out those persons who lack the skills and education to qualify for the new types of jobs
that are emerging. Admitting such persons would only hinder efforts to upgrade the
employability of the native born population who require assistance. Moreover, such
immigrants, if admitted, would increase the competition for a diminishing number of jobs
with the native born who are being displaced and are also unprepared for the newly created
jobs. If there is a racial dimension to the mismatch scenario, -- and I believe there surely
is, it is imperative that priority be given to preparing those minority groups who are being
adversely affected for the newly created jobs. Immigration policy should not be allowed to
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sabotage this incorporation process. On the positive side, the mismatch scenario means
that the nation is confronted with a golden opportunity to rid itself of the real threat of
economic polarization along racial lines.
Thus, immigration policy is emerging as a critical element of both national
economic and social policies. How immigration policy should be shaped, therefore,
depends directly upon how one interprets the prevailing economic trends and domestic
social conditions.
The Anomalies of Immigration Policymaking
Although immigration policy is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, it has --
since a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the late 19th Century -- become the sole
policymaking province of federal government. But because "everyone has to be
somewhere," the actual impact of immigration policy is played-out in those states and their
respective cities and towns where the immigrants actually reside. Thus, policymakers in
state and local governments can only respond to what the federal government decides to do
(or not to do) with immigration policy at any given time. Neither the level nor the human
capital attributes of these immigrant flows are within the domains of these receiving states
or communities to influence. Thus, policy responsibility does not actually correspond with
the levels of government confronted with the consequences of policy design.
Throughout U.S. history, immigration policy has been called upon to serve a variety
of perceived national purposes. It has at times become intertwined with such diverse
national concerns as racial, agricultural, labor, family, human resource development,
humanitarian and foreign relations issues. Regardless of the justifications at any particular
point in time, however, there are always economic consequences. The ever present
6economic role is derived from the fact that, ultimately, most immigrants -- no matter under
what guise they enter -- must find some way to support themselves or to be supported by
others. Ideally, the welfare of immigrant workers and their dependents will also be
congruent with the best interests of the nation. But there is no assurance that such will be
the case in a post-industrial economy. Domestic economic conditions are changing rapidly.
There are signs that many citizen workers are experiencing difficulty adjusting.
Immigrants in mass numbers can themselves cause changes in labor market
conditions as well as respond to prevailing conditions. Immigration is the one aspect of
population and labor force growth that public policy should be able to control. Most of
the other key factors -- fenility, monality, emigration, and the whole range of labor force
participation issues dealing with population demographics (e.g., those characteristics
associated with age, gender, an race) are not directly controllable in a free society. To
date, however, federal policymakers in the United States have been unwilling to view
immigration policy as a form of economic policy. The design of immigration policy, as
will be discussed, is largely dominated by political objectives that are intended to appease
powerful special interest groups. Immigration policy is not responsible for its sizable
economic consequences. Less than 4% of the immigrants and refugees who are legally
admitted to the United States each year are admitted on the basis that the skills and
educations they possess are actually believed to be in demand by U.S. employers. The
percentage is considerably less than 1% if illegal immigrants are included in the total
immigrant flow. In addition, little serious effort is made to find out if citizen workers
could be used to fill jobs for which non-immigrant workers are currently being recruited
and employed by U.S. industries.
7The immigrant flow -- in all of its diverse forms -- accounts for anywhere from
one-quarter to one-third of the annual growth of the U.S. labor force. The presence of a
considerable number of illegal immigrants complicates efforts to be precise. It is highly
probable that, when the female labor force participation rates (that have been rising for
several decades) eventually stabilize and when the flow of "baby boomers" into the work
force begins to ebb (as it soon will), immigration could, by the turn of the 21st Century,
comprise all of the annual growth of the nation's labor force. Thus, the critical importance
of adopting a rational basis for the nation's immigration policy should be apparent.
The Extant Immigration System: Its Priorities and Indifferences
There is no simple or quick way to describe the process by which immigrants enter
the labor force and population of the United States. The complexity is, of course, one of
the reasons there are pleas for reform. Few policymakers and even fewer citizens
understand what the existing admission practices are. As with the tax laws and the welfare
laws, the nation's extant immigration system is the cumulative collection over the years of
a hodge-podge of dubious political compromises. Also like the tax and welfare systems,
the immigration system suffers from considerable abuse due to enforcement laxities and
legal limitations inherent in a free society.
A comprehensive discussion of the history of the immigration policy of the United
States is beyond present purposes.? Nonetheless, a brief highlight of its evolution is
essential to understanding the thesis that a change from its present course is desperately
needed.
For its first century as an independent nation, the United States had neither ceilings
nor screening restrictions on the number and type persons permitted to enter for permanent
8or temporary settlement. The nation was in its pre-industrial stage of economic
development. The economy was overwhelmingly dominated by agriculture (as late as
1880, 70 percent of the labor force were employed in this industrial sector alone). With a
vast amount of land that was largely unpopulated, an unregulated immigration policy was
consistent with the nation's basic economic needs. It was also a pragmatic position. The
new nation simply did not have the enforcement capacity to effectively restrict immigration
along its vast borders.
When the industrialization process began in earnest during the latter decades of the
19th Century, the newly introduced technology of mechanization required unskilled workers
to fill job openings in its urban labor markets. Not all would-be immigrants, however,
were welcomed. The nation's equity ideals were sublimated during this era. Not only did
domestic racial segregation lock-in on the "newly freed" black citizen population of the
South, but prejudice against some of the newer ethnic immigrants led to discrimination
being institutionalized in the nation's immigration policies toward the outside world.
Asians were the first racial group to be banned from immigrating.
From purely an efficiency standpoint, however, the mass immigration of the late
19th Century and early 20th Century was generally consistent with the domestic economic
needs. Agriculture remained the nation's largest single employment sector (accounting for
one-third of all employment as late as 1920). The rapidly emerging new employment
sectors of manufacturing and mining generated jobs that required very little in the way of
skills, education, literacy, or fluency in English for the work force. The enormous supply
of immigrants who came during these years typically lacked these attributes. Nonetheless,
they reasonably matched the effective demand for labor at the time. As late as the eve of
9the entry of the United States into World War I in 1917, only about six percent of the
adult labor force in the United States even had a high school diploma. Workers who
actually had college degrees were so scarce as to be considered rare. The technology of
that era asked little in the way of human resource endowments from most of the labor
force. As the history of American labor clearly shows, the available jobs largely required
blood, sweat, and tears. Most of the immigrants -- as well as most of the native born
workers -- of those times amply provided all three.
Beginning with World War I, however, the nation experienced a sharp contraction in
immigration. Following this venture into world affairs, the first quantitative restrictions on
the number of immigrants to be admitted in the nation's history were imposed. Moreover,
the pervasive negative social reactions to many of the ethnic groups who had entered
during the 1890 to 1914 period (i.e., immigrants mostly from Eastern and Southern Europe)
led to the adoption of overtly racist immigration reforms. These restrictive actions were
embodied in the Immigration Act of 1924 (also known as the National Origins Act).
Qualitative screening standards were enacted that favored Western and Northern Europeans;
disfavored other Europeans; banned virtually all Asians; and ignored most Africans. By
this time, the expanding domestic economy was characterized by the widespread
introduction of the assembly-line method of production. Capital intensive mass production
techniques no longer required unlimited numbers of workers to do labor intensive work. In
those industrial sectors in which unskilled workers were needed, employers turned to
domestic labor surpluses. These were found in the nation's massive rural economy.
During the 1920s, over 6 million people moved to urban areas and the rural population
declined for the first time since the nation was founded. The most important new supply
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of workers to respond to these urban opportunities were the black citizens of the rural
South who finally began their exodus. It should not be forgotten that it was only after
mass immigration stopped that native born blacks could gain a modicum of access to the
broad array of jobs in the U.S. economy.
The depression decade of the 1930s (with its surplus of unemployed job seekers)
was followed by the war years of the 1940s (when previously existing artificial barriers to
the employment of women and minority groups weakened to absorb new domestic labor
supplies). Even the low quotas of the prevailing immigration laws were not met during
these years.
In the 1950s, the economy prospered due in large part to the pent-up consumer
demand for products and the forced-savings of the war era. It was during this period of
general affluence that the United States was finally forced to confront the legacy of racial
inequality that had plagued the nation since its inception. The Civil Rights Movement,
although it had earlier intellectual antecedents, was launched in earnest with the "bus
boycotts" in Alabama in 1957. This movement soon spread throughout most of the South
and it culminated in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (with its landmark equal
employment opportunity provisions). Just as overt racism could no longer be tolerated
within the country, it was only a logical extension of principle that such practices had to
be purged from its immigration policies toward the external world. Hence, the primary
goal of the Immigration Act of 1965 was to end the national origins admission system. In
the process, however, immigration levels were sharply increased and a politically popular
new admission system based primarily on the concept of family reunification was adopted.
Four of the current six admission preference categories of visas (i.e., 80 percent of the total
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visas annually issued) available each year are reserved for various categories of adult and
extended family relatives of persons who are already citizens. In addition, immediate
family members (i.e., spouses, minor children, and parents) of each visa holder are exempt
from all quotas and admitted automatically. President Lyndon Johnson had sought to keep
labor market priorities as the foundation for the nation's immigration policy. Labor market
priorities had been the primary basis for admission since the idea of creating preferences
for admissions was adopted in 1952. Johnson, however, could not overcome the legislative
pressures that favored a new family reunification system. Under this admission system, the
human capital endowments of legal immigrants are largely accidental with regard to their
compatibility with existing labor market needs. Likewise, because the legal system stresses
family ties, the geographic settlement patterns of immigrants are linked more to kinship
than to demonstrated local labor market needs.
The Immigration Act of 1965 also had several other unforseen features. One of
these was that it contributed to the explosion of illegal immigrants. The Act imposed a
ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration for the first time in U.S. history. A
subsequent amendment in 1976 placed a 20,000 person ceiling on the number of legal
immigrants who can enter in anyone year from anyone nation. These caps, when
combined with the nepotism of the family reunification, meant that millions of would-be
immigrants from Mexico in particular and the Caribbean Basin and Central America in
general would no longer be able to legally immigrate. Millions of such people have
continued to come anyway -- albeit in the form of illegal immigrants. The situation was
also exacerbated by the unilateral termination in 1964 of the infamous "bracero program"
with Mexico that had permitted up to almost one-half million Mexican workers to be
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employed in U.S. agricultural industry in the Southwest. Beginning in 1965, many former
braceros just kept coming anyhow -- but now illegally. Since the late 1960s, the illegal
immigration phenomena has spread to people from many other nations. The process of
entering illegally became so widespread that it led the Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee policy, appointed by President Caner, to conclude in its final report in 1981
that immigration was "out of control."8 Ultimately IRCA was adopted in 1986 to address
the illegal immigration problem but its restrictive effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated.
An entirely new admission channel for immigrants was created by the Refugee Act
of 1980. Again, the rationale of this legislation is too extensive to review for present
purposes.9 Briefly stated, this system obviously has no labor market test associated with
the admission process. There is no fixed ceiling. The number to be admitted is based on
an arbitrary figure set annually by the President, subject only to consultation with the
Congress. During the 1980s, the number of refugees and asylees admitted has been
substantial -- in some years even exceeding the number of legal immigrants admitted. The
President is under immense political pressure by special interest ethnic and religious groups
to admit more people of their panicular persuasion.
Unfonunately, in the process of altering the admission process, of experiencing mass
illegal immigration and of enlarging the scale of immigration and refugee flows, the fact
that the U.S. economy was entering a new phase of fundamental employment changes was
unforseen. It is these changes in economic circumstances that raises the greatest concern
that the present immigration and refugee systems are at odds with the nation's emerging
labor market needs.
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The Changing Nature of the U.S. Labor Market
The United States has entered its post-industrial stage of economic development.
The goods producing industries -- which had been the major employment sector throughout
U.S. history have declined significantly. Agriculture has been a negative source of
employment every year since the late 1940s. It provides jobs for less than 3 percent of
the labor force. Likewise, manufacturing -- especially its blue collar occupational
categories -- has been since the mid 1950s in sharp relative decline (accounting in the late
1980s for less than 20 percent of the employed labor force). Employment in mining has
also fallen sharply. The construction industry has shown modest employment increases but
it is an industry that is subject to frequent cyclical fluctuations.
The dramatic fall-off in employment in the goods producing industries has been
sparked by the introduction of new forms of computer controlled technology. With
computer technology, an electronic "mind" has been created for coordinating, guiding, and
evaluating most routine operations. With the introduction of a vast array of mechanical
and electrical substitutes for the human neuro-muscular system, it is now possible to link
these new computer-driven machines together into self-regulating systems that can perform
an enormous variety of work tasks. All of this is taking place in an environment of
unprecedented international competition.
Thus, the new technology and the international competitive pressures means that
high paying jobs for poorly skilled and inadequately educated workers are largely a thing
of the past. As former Secretary of Labor William E. Brock aptly said in 1987, "the days
of disguising functional illiteracy with a high paying assembly line job that simply requires
a manual skill are soon to be over. The world of work is changing right under out feet.tllO
14
The new technology is creating new jobs but the growth is concentrated in occupations that
reward extensive training and education.!! It is unlikely in the foreseeable future that there
will be an abundance of unskilled jobs. But, unless public policy changes dramatically
with regard both to labor force preparativeness and immigration admissions, there is likely
to be a chronic excess supply of unskilled job seekers. Worse yet, there could be large
numbers of unemployable persons discouraged from even seeking employment in the
legitimate labor market.12
In the wake of the sharp declines in employment in the goods producing sector,
there have been dramatic increases in the service producing industries. Responding to
major shifts in consumer spending patterns, almost 70 percent of the U.S. labor force is
employed in services in the late 1980s. The U.S. Department of Labor projects that 90
percent of the new jobs that will be created in the remainder of the 20th Century will be
in the service industries and that the service sector will account for 75 percent of all
employment by the year 2oo0.!3 Thus, the demand for labor is being radically restructured.
The supply of labor is slowly adapting but the adjustment process is not as easy nor is it
as automatic as it was in earlier eras in the nation's history.
As previously discussed, the displaced workers from the agricultural sector in the
early 20th Century had little difficulty qualifying for newly created jobs in the burgeoning
manufacturing sector. They only had to relocate and, when immigration flows were
sharply reduced between the 1920s through to the 1960s, they tended to do so. But the
emergence of the service economy has imposed an entirely different set of job requirements
on the actual and potential labor force. While the technology of earlier periods stressed
physical and manual skills for job seekers, the service economy stresses mental, social,
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linguistic, and communication skills. As a consequence, the shift to services has meant
declining job opportunities for those who lack quality educations and good work skills.
Tragically, a disproponionate number of those who are vulnerable to such adverse
employment effects are racial minorities,' women and youths.14
Related to these dramatic trends in industrial employment patterns are the derivative
changes in occupational patterns. Since the early 1970s, over one-third of the growth in
employment has occurred in the professional, technical and related workers classifications. 15
Other broad occupational groups experiencing substantially faster-than-average growth over
this period were managers, administrators, and service and sales workers. The greatest
decline in employment was among operatives, farmers, farm laborers, and private household
workers. The U.S. Department of Labor projects that, for the period of 1986 to 2000,
occupational growth will continue to be extremely uneven. Occupations expected to
experience the most rapid growth over this period are those that require the most highly
educated workers. These include executives, administrators, and managers; professionals;
and technicians and related support workers. Collectively, these three occupational
categories accounted for 25 percent of total employment in 1986 but are expected to
constitute 40 percent of the nation's employment growth for the remainder of the century. 16
Absolute declines are projected for the lower skilled occupations in farming and private
household work, and only marginal growth is expected in the operative and laborer
occupations.
Without unduly belaboring the obvious, the critical conclusion is best summarized
by a Department of Labor study of anticipated occupational demand projections up to the
year 2000: "It should be pointed out that the occupational clusters projected to decline or
16
grow slowly are generally those requiring the least amount of education and training and
those projected to grow the fastest require the most education and training. 1117 Thus, the
occupational trends of the present and the near future are apparent. The question is the
ability of the supply of labor to adequately respond.
The New York City Experience
The New York City labor market provides an excellent example of the twin effects
of rapid shifts in industrial employment patterns (on the demand side) and of mass
immigration (on the supply side).18 The New York City labor force, with about 3.2 million
resident workers and another 700,000 daily commuting workers from its suburbs, is larger
than the separate labor forces of 42 states. The City accounts for about 38 percent of the
State's labor force. The New York City SMSA also has the largest absolute number of
foreign born persons in its population in the nation (1.9 million persons in 1980). In
addition to the foreign born, the City also has about one million Pueno Ricans who, as
citizens, are counted among the native born.
Looking first at employment patterns, Table 1 shows first that while employment in
the State has increased since 1960, virtually all of the growth has come outside the City of
New York. Secondly, it shows that the manufacturing sector of the City has drastically
declined but only slightly so in the balance of the State. Table 2 shows the employment
trends since 1960 for the nine industrial sectors for the City and for the balance of the
State. The long list of minus in the City's column tells a bleak story. Only two of eight
private sector industries have shown any growth. Both of these growth industries are
disproponionately composed of white collar occupations. The public sector has sustained
marginal growth and one component -- federal employment -- is actually falling. Aside
State Minus
Industry/Y ears N.Y. State N.Y. City City
Total Nonagricultural
Employees
1960 6,181 3,538 2,643
1986 7,905 3,539 4,366
Difference + 1,724 +---r + f,723
Manufacturing
1960 1,878 946 932
1986 1,250 390 860
Difference 628
- 556 n
Nonmanufacturing
1960 4,303 2,591 1,712
1986 6,655 3,148 3,507
Difference + 4332 +~ + f,795
Note: Parts may not equal totals due to rounding
Source: New York State Department of Labor
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TABLE 1
MANUFACTURING AND NONMANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES ON
NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS IN NEW YORK STATE, NEW YORK
CITY, AND STATE MINUS CITY TOTALS, 1960 AND 1986
(in thousands)
State Minus
Industry/years N.Y. State N.Y. City City
Manufacturing
1960 1,878 946 932
1986 1,250 390 860
Difference
- 628 - 556 -72
Mining
1960 10 2 8
1986 6 1 5
Difference 4 1
- 3
Construction
1960 266 127 139
1986 309 113 196
Difference + 43 -14 +57
Transportation, Communication,
& PUDlicUtilities
1960 482 318 164
1986 402 218 184
Difference
-SO - 100 +20
Wholesale Trade
1960 420 315 105
198~ 477 238 239
Difference +57
- 77 +134
Retail Trade
1960 831 430 401
1986 1,198 401 797
Difference + 367 -29 +396
.
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
1960 480 384 96
1986 755 527 228
Difference + 275 + 143 + 132
Personal Services
1960 978 607 371
1986 2,042 1,077 965
Difference + 1,064 + 470 + 594
Government
1960 837 408 429
1'1 ~6 1,382 574 808
Difference + 545 + 166 + 379
Note: Parts may not equal due to rounding
Source: New York State Department of Labor
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TABLE 2
EMPLOYEES ON NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS IN NE\VYORK
STATE, NEW YORK CITY, AND STATE MINUS CITY TOTALS,
1960 AND 1986
(in thousands)
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from the decline of manufacturing, the most disturbing revelation in Table 2 is the fact that
retail and wholesale trade sectors both show minus figures for New York City. This is
shocking! Nationwide and in the balance of New York State both of these trade sectors
are booming. The retail and wholesale trade are sectors that traditionally are large
employers of women, youth, minorities and part-time workers. They often provide entry
level jobs for large numbers of workers. Such no longer is the case in New York City.
Clearly, the industrial patterns are being radically transformed. There is serious reason for
concern over labor force adjustment in such circumstances.
On the labor supply side, the resident labor force essentially has no racial majority.19
In 1987, 51 percent of the labor force were non-Hispanic whites; 21 percent were
Hispanics; and 29 percent were blacks and others (separate data for Asians were not
tabulated). Fully 75 percent of the State's minority population live in New York City and
most of the remainder live in the adjacent suburbs. The minorities are the fastest growing
component in the State's population. It is an ominous sign that the minority populations
disproportionately live and seek work in the City's labor market where there has been
virtually no absolute growth in the number of jobs; where radical shifts in the industrial
employment patterns are occurring; and where entry level jobs are vanishing.20
Since less than four percent of New York City residents seek employment outside
the City, it is important to try to explain how the labor force is responding to these
sweeping changes. Figure 1 shows the unemployment trends and the labor force
participation trends for the City relative to the U.S. It is of particular note to see that the
unemployment rates in New York City have been recently been below those of the United
States. No doubt, it is this relationship that has generated the perception that there is a
FIGURE 1
17A
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES,
UNITED STATES AND NEW YORK CITY 1967-1987
(TOTAL, AGE 16 YEARS AND OLDER)
Labor force participation rates,
United States and New York City,
1967-88
<Total, age 16 vears and over)
~ercent
66
57.,
" , ,
, ,.-,' ~..\ , , \
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NewYOrli:Cltv
Unemployment rates,
United States and New York City,
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labor shortage in the City. But when the trends in labor force participation rates are
examined, the New York City trends are sharply divergent from those of the nation. The
national labor force participation rates in the 1980s are following the predicted course
taught in the labor economics textbooks: as unemployment falls, labor force participation
rises. But in New York City, the falling unemployment rate has been accompanied by
sharply declining labor force participation rates. Figure 2 shows an even worse picture. It
traces the labor force participation trends for 16 to 19 year olds in the nation and in New
York City. The figure for youth in New York City for 1987 is more than 32 percent
below from the national average for comparably aged youth. The participation rates are
even lower for minorities (see Table 3). Thus, this data suggests that a massive
withdrawal from the labor force is in progress in the City. This mass discouragement is a
symptom of the existence of a mismatch between the types of jobs available and the lack
of qualifications of potential job seekers. It means working age persons are available but
they are unemployable. It is also a sign of a growing underc1ass with strong racially
divisive implications.
As for the role of immigration, the available data shown that immigrants are highly
concentrated into only a handful of industries. As shown in Table 4, almost one half (47
percent) of all post 1965 immigrants are employed in only 13 industries of over 200
industries for which such industrial data is collected. These 13 industries, accounted in
1980 for 34.8 percent of all the jobs in the City. Table 4 also shows the inordinately high
penetration of immigrant workers into both declining industries (such as manufacturing,
private household work and retail businesses) as well as growth industries (such as
hospitals, banking, real estate, insurance, and motels and hotels) in New York City. The
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FIGURE 2
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES, UNITED STATES AND NEW YORK CITY, 1967-1988
(BOTH SEXES, AGES 16 TO 19 YEARS OLD)
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TABLE 3
CIVILIAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATES, BY RACE AND GENDER, UNITED STATES AND
NEW YORK CITY, 1987 AND 1988
Civilian Uft8ipIOy88ftt rates and labor force Plrt1c1pat1on rates.
l1li1ted States IIId York C1tl
(not seasonally adjusted)
Agl. race, and SIX
Une~loyment
rate
Participation
-aU
1987 I 1!188 1987 I l!1t1ij
Note: Data oased on averages for tnl first six mcntns of eacn year.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor
Post-1965
Immigrants Employed
Percent
Total of Total
Industry Employed Number Employed
Total for all industries 2,897,880 492,760 17.0
Apparel manufacturing 118,540 42,760 36.1
Hospitals 185,820 41,660 22.4
Eating/drinking establishments 110,640 36,820 33.3
Banking 125,320 21,540 17.2
Construction 77,9fIJ 15,120 19.4
Real estatelbuilding management 71,660 11,540 16.1
Private households 30,620 11,520 37.6
Nursing facilities 3O,9fIJ 9,820 31.7
Miscellaneous manufacturing 32,080 9,520 29.7
Grocery stores 47,040 8,920 19.0
Insurance 76,980 8,720 11.3
. Motelslhotels 25,420 7,860 30.9
Printing/publishing 74,280 7,760 10.4
Total 1,007,320 233,560 23.2
All other industries 1,890,560 259,200 13.7
Source:
l8C
TABLE 4
NEW YORK CITY INDUSTRIES WITH CONCENTRATIONS
OF NEW IMMIGRANTS, 1980
(in rank order by number orpost-1965 immigrants employed)
Elizabeth Bogen, Immi~tion in New York (New York: Pra.eger Publish~rs,
a division of Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987) p. 85. The data In the Table IS
tabulated from the 1980 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Samples.
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Office of Immigrant Affairs for New York City which compiled and released this data in
1987 warned that "because the census omitted the majority of undocumented aliens and
because some are employed off the books, the concentration of immigrants in those
industries may be even higher than census data suggest."21 Given the huge immigrant
flows that have occurred since 1980, it is certain that the 1990 Census will reveal even
larger concentrations of immigrant workers.
With immigrant concentrations of this magnitude, it is hard to argue that the
presence of immigrant workers is not affecting both wage levels and employment
opportunities in these particular industries over what might prevail in their absence. It is
wonh noting in passing, that the study also found striking "ethnic demarcation lines"
between which immigrants were employed in which industry and which were not.22
Because the decline in employment is so pervasive, many immigrants are in direct
competition with the city's considerable unskilled and poorly educated citizen population
for the jobs that remain in the declining sectors of the economy. Too often, the
consequences of even fewer job opportunities being available and depressed wages are
borne by the citizen-workers who are typically Black and Puerto Rican. Many
immigrants -- especially those from Third World backgrounds -- will do whatever it takes
to survive. They will double up families in apartments, work dual jobs, have several
family members in the labor force, and accept substandard wages and working conditions.
These are the characteristics of labor markets in contemporary Third World nations. Yet
these appalling living and working conditions -- reminiscent of supposedly bygone
"sweatshop" eras in this country -- are being revived once more in the nation's largest city.
It should not be surprising that many citizen New Yorkers simply cannot or will not
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compete for jobs on such demeaning and often unfair terms. For too many citizens, the
options are unemployment, or welfare, or participation in the city's enormous "irregular"
economy.
The Role In Immigration Policy in a Post-Industrial U.S. Economy
By the late 1980s, the industrial and occupational employment needs of the U.S.
economy are crystal clear. As immigration policy is a way of affecting both the size and
the composition of the supply of workers, it should admit only the number and types of
persons who complement emerging labor demand patterns. It should not increase the labor
supply of workers who lack the skills and education that are required to fill existing job
vacancies. Likewise, it should not be allowed to forestall the pressures to develop the
employment potential of native born citizens who should be prepared for the jobs in the
growth sectors. In a word, the immigration policy of the nation should be flexible.
At this stage of U.S. economic development, the types of workers who are needed
are those that already have skills, education and experience and, for whatever reason,
voluntarily wish to leave their homelands. Such is especially the case of workers who are
in fields that involve computer technology; conduct scientific research and; provide higher
education itself. Obviously, the nation should be preparing its native born citizens for the
high skilled, high paying, and high status jobs that the post-industrial economy is
generating. But human resource development requires a long term perspective to be
successful. Providing qualified teachers, adequate facilities, and up-to-date instructional
aids and equipment are all critical educational problems in the United States.
Unfortunately, the findings of the numerous presidential commissions on the status of
education in the nation in the 1980s have already concluded that the nation is failing at
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every educational 'level. There is no greater national priority other than to reverse these
trends and to address these educational deficiencies. But at this juncture, sad to say, the
nation must look elsewhere in the World for a temporary way to fill many of the jobs that
require high skills and advanced education.
Great care must be exercised to assure that such an immigration policy focus does
not forestall training and education of native citizens for these quality jobs. Given the
increasingly multi-cultural and racial character of the U.S. labor force, it is mandatory for
equity reasons that citizen minorities in particular be given opportunities to prepare and to
qualify for these emerging high skilled jobs. The social cohesion of the nation in the
future will depend directly upon the avoidance of an occupational polarization of the labor
force along racial lines. Hence, the importation of skilled immigrant and non-immigrant
labor should be administered in a flexible fashion by a responsible governmental agency
and not by fixed statutory provisions or by arbitrary rulings of courts. It must be a policy
that is capable of being coordinated with other human resource development policies and
equal employment opportunity objectives.
Conversely, the rise of the service economy is raising the knowledge levels of
persons who can qualify and hold jobs. The U.S. Department of Labor has estimated that
about 75 percent of the unemployed persons in the United States have reading and writing
problems.23 It is also believed that there may be as many as 23 million functionally
illiterate adults in the U.S. population and an equal number who are only marginally
illiterate.24 No advanced industrial nation at this juncture of its economic development that
has so many adult illiterates (and whose ranks are swelling each year) need have any fears
about a shortage of unskilled labor. One of the major contributing factors to the growth of
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adult illiteracy is immigration n especially by illegal immigrants and refugees.25 Thus,
with the possible exception of legitimate political refugees, there is no reason to admit
legally or to tolerate illegal entry by persons who can only qualify for low skilled jobs that
require minimal education. To the contrary, immigration should admit only people who
have a high probability of finding employment in growth sectors and who are trained,
educated, and who have experience in occupations for which shortages presently exist. For
those granted refugee and asylee status, there should be a parallel obligation by the Federal
government to entitle all such persons to training, education, and language assistance if
they lack such skills. Such policies would facilitate their entry into the labor force. Such
adjustment burdens should not fallon local and state governments who have no say in the
entry of such persons. It also goes without need for elaboration that there should be strict
enforcement of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 with its strictures against
illegal immigration. The gaping enforcement loopholes in this legislation that do not
provide adequate identification safeguards to give true meaning to this Act should be
closed.
Thus, immigration policy must be seen as being a major element of the nation's
arsenal of economic policies. In such a role, it has the potential to help the nation
overcome the mismatch problem it is currently confronted. It can temporarily admit those
workers with the skills, education, and experience needed to fill the contemporary labor
shonages. But it should do so only to the degree that these numbers do not significantly
influence the pressure of the market place to signal priorities to develop the nation's citizen
workers for these jobs over the long run. Likewise, it is especially urgent that the
elimination of the labor surpluses that co-exist with the labor shortages be recognized as
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being a problem of co-equal significance. Labor shortages represent a "window of
opportunity" for the nation's minority worker force but the pressure to address their chronic
human resource development needs is endangered by "the wild card" of contemporary
unguided immigration policy. This must not be allowed to continue. The labor market
trends of the 1990s provide the United States with the biggest single opportunity in our
history to rid the nation once and for all of inequality of economic opportunity. It may
well be the last chance -- given the growing dimensions of the nation's racial underclass --
to end the legacy of unfairness. It will be a social and economic disaster if we allow our
immigration policy to undermine this generation's good fortune to be able to accomplish
this feat. To do it, however, the nation must adopt an immigration policy that contributes
to the solution and is not part of the problem.
..
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